Police AI Deployment Tracker
A structured, international record of which police forces and public bodies use which artificial intelligence and algorithmic systems, on what legal basis, and under what oversight. Currently covers the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, France, China and Russia. Every entry is tied to a public, verifiable source — and where verification is genuinely harder in some countries than others, that is stated rather than glossed over.
This is a partial record and a work in progress. It covers well-documented public deployments and is not a complete picture of AI use in policing anywhere. Much of that use is not publicly disclosed. Entries are included only where they can be tied to a published source, and each shows the date it was last checked. Worth saying plainly: independent verification is far easier in countries with a free press, functioning courts and an active privacy regulator than in ones without. Entries for China and Russia rely on human rights researchers and investigative journalism working around significant state restrictions on information, rather than on official disclosure. That limitation is real, and no attempt is made to paper over it.
| Country | Force / body | Technology | Status | Since |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US | ~3,100 US police departments (company estimate)National | Clearview AI facial recognitionClearview AI | Operational | 2020 |
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Legal basis: Varies by state; several states and 20+ cities have banned or restricted police facial recognition Oversight: Fragmented. State and city-level restrictions in some jurisdictions, but no single federal framework. Clearview markets its database of images scraped from the web as an investigative lead-generation tool, and states results are indicative rather than definitive matches requiring further verification. Multiple documented wrongful arrests have followed cases where that verification step was skipped, including Randal Quran Reid (Georgia, arrested for a Louisiana offence he had no connection to) and a Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office case that led to a $200,000 settlement. Also contracted separately to ICE ($9.2m, 2025), US Customs and Border Protection ($225,000, 2026) and the US Army’s 1st Special Forces Command. Source: Company statements; ACLU documentation of wrongful arrest cases; contract reporting · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| US | 5,000+ US law enforcement agenciesNational | Flock Safety ALPRFlock Safety | Operational | 2018 |
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Legal basis: Varies by state; no dedicated federal ALPR statute Oversight: Fragmented. State-level audits in some cases (e.g. Illinois), but no single national body. Automated licence-plate reader network reported to cover more than 5,000 US law enforcement agencies and 6,000 municipalities, one of the largest surveillance networks of its kind. An Illinois state audit found federal agencies including CBP had gained access to state ALPR data through an undisclosed pilot arrangement, in apparent breach of a state law restricting data sharing for immigration enforcement; Illinois subsequently removed 47 agencies from data access. Washington State passed the Driver Privacy Act in 2026 requiring warrants for most federal access to ALPR data. Source: Company statements; Illinois state audit findings, reported by State of Surveillance and the ACLU · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| UK | All UK forcesNational | ANPR (Automatic Number Plate Recognition)Multiple | Operational | 2006 |
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Legal basis: DPA 2018 Part 3; ANPR national standards Oversight: National ANPR Service; Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner The National ANPR Service processes tens of millions of reads daily. Retention periods and access controls are set nationally. Source: Home Office National ANPR Service documentation · last checked 2026-08-06 |
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| UK | At least 21 English police forcesEngland | Microsoft 365 Copilot (generative AI)Microsoft | Operational | 2025 |
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Legal basis: Internal force policy; no dedicated statutory framework for generative AI use Oversight: Individual force AI-use policy; no independent national oversight body confirmed Deployed via the Police Digital Service’s National Police Capabilities Environment, an Azure-based platform launched in 2025 for shared force applications. Use covers report drafting, case-file summarising and similar administrative tasks. A Sky News survey found at least 21 forces continued using Copilot after West Midlands Police withdrew it (see separate entry); only eight forces confirmed it could not be used in investigations, indicating force-level policy varies and is not centrally standardised. Source: Sky News investigation, reported via Resultsense · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| UK | Home Office / multiple forcesNational | Retrospective Facial Recognition (PND search)Police National Database facility | Operational | 2014 |
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Legal basis: DPA 2018 Part 3 Oversight: Biometrics Commissioner; subject of long-running custody image retention criticism Custody images of people never charged have been retained on searchable systems, a point raised repeatedly by oversight bodies. Source: Biometrics Commissioner annual reports · last checked 2026-08-06 |
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| UK | Metropolitan PoliceLondon | Live Facial RecognitionNEC (NeoFace) | Operational | 2020 |
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Legal basis: Common law policing powers; DPA 2018 Part 3 Oversight: Force LFR policy documents; ICO engagement Deployed at targeted operations rather than continuously. The force publishes deployment records and arrest figures. Source: Metropolitan Police LFR publications · last checked 2026-08-06 |
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| CN | Ministry of Public Security (national)National | Skynet / Sharp Eyes camera and facial recognition networkMultiple domestic manufacturers | Operational | 2005 |
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Legal basis: State mandate; no independent judicial authorisation process reported Oversight: None independent identified; internal Communist Party and state administration only Skynet, launched 2005, and its 2015 expansion Sharp Eyes (Xueliang), were mandated by China’s National Development and Reform Commission to achieve reported “100%” video surveillance coverage of public areas by 2020, combining facial recognition, licence plate recognition and, in some deployments, integration with home television boxes allowing residents to view local camera feeds. Independent verification is inherently limited by China’s information environment; figures here are as reported by specialist industry researcher IPVM and corroborated by Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and the Brookings Institution, rather than by Chinese government disclosure. Source: IPVM technical analysis; Georgetown CSET; Brookings Institution · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| RU | Moscow police (Ministry of Internal Affairs)Moscow | Facial recognition CCTV network (including systems reported as “Sfera” and “Face Control”)Domestic and NtechLab-linked systems reported | Operational | 2017 |
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Legal basis: Internal Ministry of Internal Affairs authorisation; no independent judicial warrant process reported for routine use Oversight: None independent identified Facial recognition has been integrated into Moscow’s CCTV network, including metro station cameras, since at least 2017, growing to a reported 178,000-plus camera network. Independent human rights monitor OVD-Info has documented 595 cases since 2021 in which the technology was used against protesters and dissidents, including 454 detentions following 2021 protests in support of Alexei Navalny and a further wave of preventive detentions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It was also reportedly used to identify and detain people who attended Navalny’s funeral in 2024. Source: OVD-Info documentation; Meduza, RFE/RL and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reporting · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| UK | Multiple retailers (private)England & Wales | Facewatch facial recognitionFacewatch | Operational | 2018 |
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Legal basis: UK GDPR legitimate interests; ICO assessed Oversight: ICO issued findings on Facewatch in 2023 Privately operated rather than police-run, but shares watchlist data with policing in some arrangements. Included because the boundary between commercial and police surveillance is a recurring issue. Source: ICO statement on Facewatch · last checked 2026-08-06 |
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| UK | South Wales PoliceWales | Live Facial RecognitionNEC (NeoFace) | Operational | 2017 |
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Legal basis: Common law; considered in R (Bridges) v South Wales Police Oversight: Court of Appeal judgment 2020 required changes to policy The Bridges case remains the leading UK authority on police facial recognition. The force revised its policy following the judgment. Source: R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2020] EWCA Civ 1058 · last checked 2026-08-06 |
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| CN | Xinjiang regional policeXinjiang | Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)State-developed, with Hikvision (CETC) reported as an equipment supplier | Operational | 2016 |
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Legal basis: State “Strike Hard” campaign policy; described by Human Rights Watch as contrary to Chinese law and international human rights obligations Oversight: None independent; documented externally through investigative research rather than official reporting Human Rights Watch reverse-engineered the IJOP mobile app used by Xinjiang police and officials, publishing a detailed technical report in May 2019. The platform aggregates biometric data including facial imagery and, per other researchers, iris scans and DNA samples, alongside behavioural and religious-practice indicators, to flag individuals for investigation or detention. It is reported to have contributed to the arbitrary detention of up to one million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in the region. This is among the most severe documented uses of algorithmic policing anywhere and is tracked as a distinct entry from the national Skynet/Sharp Eyes network given its scale of documented harm. Source: Human Rights Watch, “China’s Algorithms of Repression: Reverse Engineering a Xinjiang Police Mass Surveillance App” · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| FR | French national police and gendarmerieNational | Algorithmic video surveillance (VSA / vidéosurveillance algorithmique)Multiple contractors | Trial | 2023 |
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Legal basis: Law No. 2023-380 (2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games Law), Article 7 Oversight: Conseil constitutionnel; CNIL (data protection authority) Authorised on an experimental basis for the 2024 Paris Olympics, explicitly excluding facial recognition and other biometric identification. France’s Constitutional Council upheld the law; it made France the first EU country to legalise algorithmic video surveillance at this scale. The original authorisation expired as planned on 31 March 2025. Reporting since then is genuinely inconsistent: some sources describe a subsequent extension to March 2027 via separate transport-safety legislation, while at least one legal tracker states France had no operative statutory basis for AI video surveillance as of early 2026, and a related extension attempt (via a narcotics-law amendment) was struck down by the Constitutional Council in June 2025. Recorded here as a trial given that unresolved uncertainty, rather than asserting a specific current status the available sources do not agree on. Source: French government legislation; Conseil constitutionnel rulings; Amnesty International France and Statewatch reporting · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| AU | Australian Federal Police and state police (Queensland, Victoria, South Australia)National and state | Clearview AI facial recognition (free trial)Clearview AI | Discontinued | 2019 |
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Legal basis: Privacy Act 1988; Australian Government Agencies Privacy Code Oversight: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), joint investigation with UK ICO Australian police agencies trialled Clearview AI free of charge between October 2019 and March 2020, initially denying use until a leaked customer list revealed it. In October 2021 the OAIC, following a joint investigation with the UK Information Commissioner’s Office, found Clearview AI breached the Privacy Act and ordered it to stop collecting Australians’ images and delete existing data; the AFP’s specific trial was found to be unapproved “shadow IT” conducted without a formal privacy assessment, and the OAIC separately ordered the AFP to improve its practices. The OAIC has no jurisdiction over state police forces. The free trial itself ended in March 2020. Source: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Commissioner-initiated investigation determination · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| UK | Durham ConstabularyNorth East England | HART (Harm Assessment Risk Tool)In-house, with Cambridge University | Discontinued | 2016 |
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Legal basis: Custody decision support Oversight: Academic review; extensive published critique An early and unusually well-documented custody risk-scoring tool. Its use of a commercial postcode-based variable attracted particular criticism. Source: Published academic evaluation and force statements · last checked 2026-08-06 |
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| US | Mountain View Police DepartmentCalifornia | Flock Safety ALPRFlock Safety | Discontinued | 2022 |
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Legal basis: City council authorisation Oversight: City council vote following public disclosure Police Chief Mike Canfield disclosed to the city council in February 2026 that federal agencies had gained access to the city’s Flock camera data without the city’s knowledge. The council voted unanimously to terminate the contract and the department discontinued use. Included as a specific, well-documented instance of a US agency withdrawing a deployment after an oversight failure, distinct from the wider Flock Safety entry tracked separately. Source: City council disclosure, reported by State of Surveillance and the ACLU · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| CA | Royal Canadian Mounted Police (National Child Exploitation Crime Centre)National | Clearview AI facial recognitionClearview AI | Discontinued | 2019 |
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Legal basis: Privacy Act (federal public sector); found in breach Oversight: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Special Report to Parliament The RCMP’s National Child Exploitation Crime Centre used Clearview AI from October 2019, initially denying use before confirming it after the company’s client list was leaked. The Privacy Commissioner found the RCMP made 521 searches, not the 78 it first disclosed, and that only around 6% related to child exploitation as claimed. A June 2021 Special Report to Parliament found the RCMP contravened the Privacy Act. The RCMP disputed the finding but had stopped using the service after Clearview AI ceased Canadian operations in mid-2020 during the investigation. Source: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Special Report to Parliament · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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| UK | West Midlands PoliceWest Midlands | Microsoft 365 Copilot (generative AI)Microsoft | Discontinued | 2025 |
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Legal basis: Internal force policy; no dedicated statutory framework for generative AI use Oversight: House of Commons Home Affairs Committee inquiry Copilot was used while preparing an intelligence assessment ahead of a November 2025 Europa League fixture between Aston Villa and Maccabi Tel Aviv, and hallucinated a non-existent match involving disorder, which fed into a local Safety Advisory Group’s decision to bar away fans. Chief Constable Craig Guildford initially told the Home Affairs Committee no AI had been used, then corrected this in a written admission; he retired in January 2026. The force withdrew Copilot from operational use in March 2026 pending review. Included as a specific, well-documented instance of AI-related error and its consequences, distinct from the wider Copilot rollout tracked separately. Source: House of Commons Home Affairs Committee correspondence, reported by ITV News · last checked 2026-08-08 |
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How this is compiled
Entries are drawn from force publications, regulator decisions, inspectorate reports, court judgments, parliamentary proceedings, procurement records and substantial press coverage. National privacy regulators have been particularly valuable outside the UK and US. Canada's Office of the Privacy Commissioner and Australia's OAIC in particular publish detailed, citable investigation findings. For the US specifically, the Electronic Frontier Foundation's Atlas of Surveillance, a maintained, independently researched database covering thousands of US jurisdictions, is checked as a primary reference. For countries where independent oversight bodies do not operate freely, human rights organisations and investigative journalism are the only realistic route, and are cited as such. Nothing is recorded as operational unless a public source says so, and anything that cannot be tied to a source is left out rather than estimated. Status values are deliberately blunt (operational, trial, paused, discontinued or proposed) because a more granular scale would imply a precision the available evidence does not support.
Related coverage is tracked continuously in the news feed, and by subject on the topic pages.